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Byzantine agreement is a fundamental issue in
faulttolerant and secure distributed computing Pro
tocols solving Byzantine agreement guarantee that a
sender can transmit a value to a group of receivers
consistently even if some of the nodes including the
sender are arbitrarily faulty
In the past protocols for Byzantine agreement were
generally either authenticated or nonauthenticated
Nonauthenticated protocols make no use of signatures
while in authenticated protocols all messages have to
be signed
Authenticated protocols can tolerate more faults
and are more messageecient than nonauthenticated
protocols but they have the disadvantage of time
consuming signature generation In this paper we in
troduce techniques to reduce the amount of signatures
by combining mechanisms from authenticated and non
authenticated protocols
Keywords Byzantine agreement fault tolerance
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  Introduction
The problem of Byzantine agreement arises when
a set of nodes in a distributed system needs to have
a consistent view of a message sent by one of them
despite the presence of arbitrarily faulty nodes
 More
precisely a protocol solving Byzantine agreement must
satisfy the following conditions
B All correct nodes decide for the same
value

B If the sender is correct all nodes decide
for the value of the sender

B Each correct node eventually decides for a
value

Protocols solving Byzantine agreement are generally
divided into two classes authenticated protocols and
nonauthenticated protocols
 In authenticated proto
cols all messages are signed digitally in a way that the
signatures cannot be forged and a signed message can
be unambiguously assigned to its signer
 This mech
anism allows a node to prove to others that it has
received a certain message from a certain node
 Au
thenticated protocols can tolerate an arbitrary num
ber of faulty nodes
 In nonauthenticated protocols
no messages are signed
 These protocols require more
than two thirds of the participating nodes to be correct
LSP
 For both paradigms of authenticated and
nonauthenticated protocols there exist customized
protocol techniques

Although message authentication allows for an op
timal fault tolerance the generation of signatures is a
very timeconsuming task
 For this reason the fault
tolerance of protocols which require message authen
tication only in certain rounds has been investigated
in Bor
 The protocols given there were maximally
faulttolerant for a given number of authenticated
rounds but not very messageecient

A dierent approach has been taken in in ST

There authenticated messages are simulated by non
authenticated subprotocols
 This allows to transform
authenticated protocols easily into nonauthenticated
protocols while keeping some of their properties
 But
with this technique the good faulttolerance proper
ties of authenticated protocols are lost

Hence the question arises whether it is possible
to combine techniques for authenticated and non
authenticated protocols for use in partially authenti
cated protocols
 The resulting protocols should bal
ance the low message complexity and high fault toler
ance of authenticated protocols with the fast message
generation on nonauthenticated protocols

In this paper we answer this question to the posi
tive
 We give protocols which make use of mixed tech
niques and identify situations in which they are ap
plicable
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 System Model
Our world consists of n nodes connected by a com
plete network
 We assume that t of the nodes may
behave in an arbitrary manner while c  n  t always
behave correctly
 The number of nodes that actually
behave faulty during a given protocol execution will
be denoted with f f  t

The nodes operate at a known minimal speed and
messages are transmitted reliably in bounded time

The receiver of a message can identify its immediate
sender and we assume the existence of an authen
tic signature scheme such that a signature cannot be
forged and each node knows whom a signature on a
message belongs to

During a protocol execution the nodes communi
cate in successive rounds
 In each round a node may
send messages to other nodes receive the messages
sent to it in the current round and perform some lo
cal computation
 m of the rounds are distinguished
as authenticated rounds
 In these rounds all messages
are to be signed
 As a convention the rst round of a
protocol will be called round 

 Main Techniques
Depending on the environment and the goals one
can choose between several dierent possible tech
niques for solving Byzantine agreement
 In the follow
ing sections we will identify some of the main ideas

The described techniques all share the same funda
mental structure





 In the following rounds the nodes report to the
others what they have received in the previous
round provided some condition is met


 Based on the messages received each node com
putes its decision value
 This decision is made after
the t st round at the latest

The techniques described dier in the condition in step
 and the way of computing the decision value in step


 Exponential Information Gathering
EIG
This technique is essentially simple fault masking

Correct nodes echo each message they receive as long
as they have not reported about that particular mes
sage in a previous round
 Hence the messages are of
the form A said B said 


 the sender said X and
no node appears twice in such a chain
 As a result
for a message which was sent in round k there should
be n  k echoes one from each node which is not yet
listed

After round t  the nodes apply a recursive ma
jority voting to the messages received
 For each mes
sage x received in round t a node takes the majority
of the echoes about this message received in round
t
 This majority value replaces the actual message
x
 Then the same procedure is applied to the mes
sages received in round t   using the new values of
the messages of round t
 This voting is repeated until
the agreedupon value of the original message of round
 is determined

In a nonauthenticated EIG protocol e
g
 in
LSP there has to be always a majority of cor
rect echoes about messages from correct nodes
 If a set
of nodes reports about a message from a faulty node
there is either an agreement about all reports includ
ing those from faulty nodes or the message itself is
not important for the agreement i
e
 a message from
a faulty node about a message from a correct node

Authentication can be used in this context for re
stricting the behaviour of the faulty nodes in that they
cannot report wrong values signed by correct nodes

This technique relaxes the requirements for the num
ber of correct nodes echoing messages
 If every message
in a protocol has to be signed any number of faulty
nodes can be tolerated
 If no messages are signed it is
required that n  t 
 Bor shows how to deter
mine the necessary number of authenticated rounds
if a given number of faulty nodes is to be tolerated

One result is that in order to tolerate t  n faulty




If in a protocol execution there are less than t faulty
nodes i
e
 f  t it is not necessary to run the pro
tocol for t   rounds
 In BGP a variation of the
EIG protocol is presented that reaches agreement and
stops after mint   f   rounds which is optimal
cf
 DRS
 This result is obtained by a more com
plex reasoning about the received messages than the
simple majority voting in the plain EIG protocol

 Sender Fault Detection
Sender fault detection SFD relies on signatures

The main principle is to discover whether the sender
behaves inconsistently towards other nodes
 If a cor
rect node sees exactly one value signed by the sender
during protocol execution it decides for that value

Otherwise it decides for a default value
 The protocol
has to guarantee that either all correct nodes see ex
actly one signed value or all correct nodes detect that
the sender is faulty

The following completely authenticated protocol
from DS has that property Each node keeps a local
set which contains the values the node has seen so far

In the rst round the sender sends its value to all
other nodes
 If in the next t rounds a node sees a
new value signed by as many nodes as there have been
rounds starting with the senders signature it adds
that value to its set
 If it is the rst or second value in
the set the node adds its signature and sends it to all
nodes which have not yet signed

The proof of correctness is not dicult If a correct
node sees two dierent signed values during the rst
t rounds it forwards them to all correct nodes which
have not seen them before
 Hence all correct nodes see
that the sender is faulty and will decide for a default
value
 If a correct node sees a second signed value in
the last round this value carries t  signatures and
has hence been seen and distributed by at least one
correct node before
 With a similar argument it can
be shown that if a correct node does not see a correctly
signed value during the protocol execution then no
correct node has seen one

This protocol has the property that if f faulty nodes
behave faulty f  t then no valid messages are sent
after round f   Suppose there is a valid message
sent at round f  
 Then it carries at least  signa
tures from correct nodes
 The third correct node must
have seen the value for the rst time one round be
fore adding its signature
 This is not possible since
the rst correct signer has broadcast the value at least
two rounds earlier
 As a consequence no valid message
is signed by more than two correct nodes

This does not imply that the protocols stop after
round f  since no correct node can be sure that no
further value will arrive in the next rounds
 Hence if
the sender is correct and has signed exactly one value
all nodes have to wait until round t   before they
can make their nal decision
 On the other hand if
a correct node has seen and forwarded two dierent
signed values it can decide for the default value im
mediately
 Furthermore it can be sure that all other
correct nodes will decide after the next round

 Combination of Dierent Techniques
As we have seen for both paradigms of authenti
cated and nonauthenticated algorithms there are suit
able techniques
 This raises the question whether it
is possible to combine these techniques for protocols
which use authentication only in certain rounds

The answer is not obvious at rst sight When in an
SFD protocol a node receives a valid message in the
last tst round it knows that all correct nodes have
seen the transmitted value because it has been signed
by t  nodes
 If not all rounds are authenticated it
cannot draw this conclusion

On the other hand in EIG protocols it is expected
that correct nodes echo the messages from a correct
node such that there is a majority of correct echoes

This is not done in SFD protocols hence this case
has to be taken care of when switching from an SFD
protocol to an EIG protocol

In the rest of the section we will use the follow
ing notation The authenticated rounds after non
authenticated rounds will be denoted ai and the non
authenticated rounds after authenticated rounds will
be denoted bi as shown in Fig
 
 If the rst round is
authenticated it is called round a and b otherwise
then a is undened
 So a can never be  and bi is
always smaller than ai
 Furthermore the last round is
regarded as authenticated round so for each bi there
is always a dened ai
 The number of pairs ai bi
i   will be denoted with s
 Subprotocols starting at
ai and bi will be called Ai and Bi respectively

Figure  shows protocols Ai and Bi
 As can be seen
Ai starts with an SFD part and switches to an EIG
part while Bi does the inverse
 The complete protocol
starting in round  will be called Protocol C
 Protocol
C is A if the rst round is authenticated and B
otherwise

The following theorem gives the requirements for
Protocol C being correct







t ai   bi  
Before we prove this theorem we need some deni
tions and lemmas
 Lemma  deals with subprotocols
of type Ai while Lemmas  and  describe properties
of protocols of type Bi
 Finally we will give the proof
of Theorem 

Denition Allfaulty Message	 A message of
the form A said B said 
 
 
 the sender said X where
all listed nodes including the sender are faulty is
called allfaulty message





Fig  Positions of the ai and bi
Protocol Ai








 In the authenticated rounds ai to bi    the nodes proceed as in an SFD protocol


 If a node receives a message in round bi    which it would usually sign and distribute to other
nodes in the next round it broadcasts this message using protocol Bi to the recipients


 The results of the subprotocols started in round bi are used together with the values received in
rounds ai to bi    for the decision
 If there is only one value this will be the result otherwise












 The results of these protocols are then subject to the recursive majority voting as described in the
EIG protocol

Fig  Protocols Ai and Bi in the mixed model
Denition 
 Partial Correctness A	 A protocol
Ai is called partially correct if it reaches agreement on
the senders message provided the sender is correct or
the message is an allfaulty message

Denition  Partial Correctness B	 A protocol
Bi is called partially correct if it reaches agreement on
the senders message provided that
a it is an echo of an allfaulty message or
b it is sent in round  i
e
 i   and b  

In these denitions the sender is meant to be the
sender of the respective subprotocol while the term
allfaulty message takes all previous rounds into ac
count

Lemma A protocol Ai  i       s is partially
correct provided there is agreement on the echoes in
round bi concerning allfaulty messages
Proof Values signed by correct nodes in rounds ai 
to bi  are seen by all correct nodes and used for the 
nal decision
 The only problem are messages which are
only signed by faulty nodes
 If the protocols starting
at round bi guarantee agreement on these messages
the protocol started in round ai  is correct
  
Lemma From round bi  to round ai there is al
ways a majority of correct echoes about messages re
ceived in the previous round provided that at most
t  bi   nodes are faulty and n  t ai   bi  
Proof For each message transmitted in round ai   
there are n   ai    t   bi   echoes
 At most
t  bi of these are from faulty nodes as opposed to
at least t  bi    t  bi    t  bi   correct
echoes
 Hence the correct echoes are a majority
 In
the rounds before round ai the majority can only be
stronger since the number of echoes is larger while the
maximum number of faulty nodes remains the same

 
Lemma A protocol Bi i       s is partially
correct provided that
a n  t ai   bi  
b there is agreement on messages sent by correct
nodes in round ai and
c there is agreement on allfaulty messages sent in
round ai
Proof Partial correctness is only concerned with
senders messages constituting echoes of allfaulty
messages or bi  
 Hence bi  faulty nodes do not
participate leaving t bi faulty participants
 Given
a Lemma  can be applied
 Hence if b holds then
all correct nodes will agree on the correct messages
due to the recursive majority voting

If the sender of Bi is faulty it is necessary that
all echoes be agreed upon
 As we have shown this is
true for the correct echoes
 The faulty echoes sent in
round bi will be agreed upon if all echoes for these
messages are agreed upon
 This is again true for the
correct echoes
 Continuing this argument we arrive at
the requirement that there be agreement on the all
faulty messages sent in round ai which is stated in
c
  
Proof of Theorem 
Lemmas  to  are now used to prove Theorem  by
reverse induction on the Ai and Bi
 The base is that
As is partially correct
 We will then show by induction
that the whole protocol is partially correct
 Finally
we prove that a partially correct protocol starting in
round  solves Byzantine Agreement

Proof of Theorem  We will prove i to iv for n 
maxs
it ai   bi  
i As is partially correct

ii Ai is partially correct  Bi is partially correct
i      s  

iii Bi is partially correct  Ai  is partially correct
i      s

iv A partially correct protocol started in round 
reaches Byzantine Agreement

i Messages signed by correct nodes are always
agreed upon they cannot be forged and are seen by
everyone
 A protocol As started for an allfaulty mes
sage has one more round that there are faulty partic
ipants
 Such a protocol is correct see proof of SFD
protocol
 Hence As is partially correct

ii We have to show that the proviso of Lemma 
is fullled
 a is part of the theorems assumptions

b and c are fullled by the partial correctness of
Ai

iii Follows directly from Lemma  and Bis partial
correctness

iv If the rst round is authenticated we can
regard the whole protocol as A
 Then As partial
correctness guarantees agreement note that a faulty
senders message is an allfaulty message
 If the rst
round is nonauthenticated the whole protocol is B
and Bs partial correctness guarantees agreement
  
 Discussion
The techniques described in the previous sections
can be applied in dierent ways depending on the re
quirements of the application
 Here are some exam
ples
 If one strives for low message complexity and ex
pects only few faulty nodes fe with regard to a
higher number t which should be tolerated in the
worst case one can use the following construc
tion Let the rst m  fe   rounds be authen
ticated
 For the second nonauthenticated part
choose an earlystopping EIG protocol
 If only fe
nodes are faulty then no messages will be sent in
the EIGpart of the protocol
 This can be shown
as follows
A valid message in the subsequent EIG protocol
has to carry fe   signatures
 In 
 it has been
shown that at most two of these signatures belong
to correct nodes so all faulty nodes must have
signed
 Hence only a correct node could be the
sender of such a message
 But all correct nodes
have seen the message before so no valid message
will be sent
 As a consequence all nodes behave
implicitly correctly and the EIG protocol will
stop after two rounds without any message over
head

For f  fe all messages sent after round m carry
at leastm  signatures from faulty nodes
 Hence
only f  m  faulty nodes can participate in an
earlystopping EIG protocol initiated in roundm

 Under this condition the EIGprotocol stops
after f m so that the complete protocol stops
after maxf fe rounds
 It is an open question
whether this can be optimized in the hybrid model

 If the goal is to avoid the timeconsuming sig
nature generation and to have early stopping
when only few faults occur one can start with
a nonauthenticated earlystopping EIGprotocol
and switch to an SFD protocol when it becomes
more expensive to handle the exponentially grow
ing number of messages than to sign the messages
of the SFDprotocol

 If the cost for signature generation always dom
inates the cost for message handling and one
wishes to nd a tradeo between worstcase pro
tocol time and fault tolerance one should use the
mixed model
 This model allows to choose a mini
mal number of rounds as authenticated rounds in
order to achieve a desired degree of fault tolerance

These rounds will generally not be consecutive
 In
Bor it has been shown that for EIG protocols
only log n authenticated rounds are neces
sary to tolerate n faulty nodes
 The results given




In this paper we have investigated partially authen
ticated protocols which make use of a combination of
dierent techniques
 We have shown that it is possible
to switch between certain techniques for authenticated
and nonauthenticated environments within a single
protocol
 With these hybrid protocols it is possible to
nd a tradeo between the high fault tolerance and
message eciency of authenticated protocols on the
one hand and the earlystopping properties and fast
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